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FOREWORD: THE ONE-HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
CHARTER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
Ross

SANDLER*

During the centennial celebration of the New York City Charter, City
political players hotly debated, as they often have before, the issue of the
allocation of power among the major players in City government. When
the dust settled on this latest controversy, the mayor had won another
skirmish in a century-long struggle. The specific controversy involved the
possibility of relocating Yankee Stadium from 161st Street in the Bronx to
a platform above the Long Island Railroad rail yards on Manhattan's West
Side. Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani appeared willing to entertain the
relocation idea, which triggered opposition throughout the city, especially
in the Bronx. Peter Vallone, the speaker of the City Council and a
candidate for governor, sought to channel the popular sentiment opposing
the Manhattan location into a vote of no confidence in the mayor and, not
incidentally, to embrace a popular issue that could bring out Democratic
voters at the November 1998 election. He engineered a Council resolution
that passed over the mayor's veto, which put the stadium issue to the voters
in a referendum.
Mayor Giuliani countered by creating a charter revision commission of
his own.' Under an obscure provision of state law, a charter revision
commission could have removed Vallone's or any referendum from the
ballot merely by proposing a Charter referendum of its own.2 Mayor
Giuliani appointed the commission in June; the commission held meetings
in July and August, and, just before the ballot deadline, proposed four
amendments to the City's campaign finance program, the most important
of which banned corporate contributions. 3 The Council, supported by most
of the City's "good government" groups, sued to keep the Yankee Stadium
referendum on the ballot and the Charter Commission's referendum off it,
but the Council was rebuffed by the state courts. 4 In November, only the
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1. See OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, NEW YORK, N.Y., CERTIFICATE OF APPOINTMENT TO
CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION (June 5, 1998).
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Charter amendment was printed in the last column of the ballot, and it
passed by a vote of nearly sixty percent to forty percent.
The Yankee Stadium dispute cannot be understood in isolation. Since
1989, when voters approved the vastly changed Charter (as described in the
article by Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., and Eric Lane), many disputes
have tested whether the Charter's allocation of power reflected political
reality. In 1995, for example, the Council and Mayor Giuliani fought over
who would have the last word on mid-year budget modifications. Faced
with falling revenues, the mayor wanted to allocate reduced funds without
Council involvement, while the Council demanded that it make the choices.
The Supreme Court of New York County left the issue partially in limbo; 5
both sides claimed victory, and a political compromise was developed.
A similar dispute arose over the authority to investigate police
corruption. The Council, responding to the revelations of the Mollen
Commission,6 passed a bill that would have established an independent
commission to investigate police corruption. 7 The Council's commission
had five members, of whom the mayor only had a say in the appointment
of three. The Council approved the creation of the commission over
Mayor Giuliani's veto; the mayor sued and won a ruling that the Council
had overstepped its Charter authority by unlawfully reducing the mayor's
responsibility for managing the police department.8 Meanwhile, the mayor
established his own version of the commission by executive order.9 The
Council, not to be outdone by the mayor, passed a second version of its
commission.'" The mayor's version is functioning, but the Council's
second commission remains a dead letter and is being reviewed by the
courts. "1
In other disputes, the city comptroller derailed the mayor's proposal to
sell the City's water system to the City's independent Water Board. 2
Several public officials including the Manhattan borough president, the

5. See Council of New York v. Giuliani, 621 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
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Combat Police Corruption, Exec. Order No. 18 (Feb. 27, 1995).
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public advocate, and the state comptroller successfully challenged the
13
mayor's refusal to make information available about agency performance.
The Council stopped the mayor from selling Health and Hospitals
Corporation hospital facilities without obtaining Council permission. 4 In
addition, both the Council and the mayor, this time standing on the same
side of an issue, lost a court battle over their refusal to fund the
independent budget office, 5 a reform authorized by the 1989 Charter. 16
These battles did not occur solely in the Giuliani administration.
Mayor David N. Dinkins and Comptroller Elizabeth Holtzman had a
stormy relationship over the registration of City contracts, with Holtzman
invoking the comptroller's Charter power more than forty times to
temporarily block Dinkins' administration contracts. They battled over the
authority to decide such issues as the level of integrity required of City
contractors and the accuracy of City certifications of vendors as womanor minority-owned enterprises.
Other battles merely await an initiating incident. The borough
presidents chafe under their limited land-use and budget powers. The
public advocate lacks substantive Charter duties and has had to invent a
role in city government (as described in the article by Public Advocate
Mark Green and his general counsel, Laurel Eisner). In addition,
developers and communities have not been fully heard from on opposing
reforms in land-use decisions.
The City Charter is often likened to a constitution. It is similar to a
constitution in that it sets forth the structure of the government; however,
the City Charter is much easier to amend. Depending on the section
involved, the Charter can be amended by passing a local law, a state
statute, or a referendum initiated by the Council or the public; by having
a charter commission recommendation and referendum; or by initiating a
combination of these methods. This establishes fundamental power
relationships not envisioned under the federal or state constitutions, each
of which is protected by an arduous, and usually deflating, amendment
process.
The ease of amending the City Charter makes it possible for the mayor
and the Council to transform their political conflicts into a competition over
13. See Messinger v. Giuliani, 218 N.Y. L.J., Sept. 2, 1997, at 29 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County Sept. 2, 1997); Green v. Safir, 664 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1997),
aff'd as modified, 679 N.Y.S.2d 383 (App. Div. 1998); McCall v. Barrios-Paoli, 671
N.Y.S.2d 974 (App. Div. 1998).
14. See Council of New York v. Giuliani, 621 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1994).
15. See In re New York Pub. Interest Research Group v. Giuliani, 644 N.Y.S.2d 38
(App. Div. 1996).
16. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 11 § 259 (1989).
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the Charter. We are likely to see more conflict rather than less as the City
begins to feel the effect of term limitations. Charter disputes since 1989
have been fewer in number than one might expect due to the presence of
holdover elected officials who participated in the 1989 Charter debates and
enjoyed collegial deference from prior relationships. The borough
presidents in the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island are today the
same individuals that were in office on January 1, 1990. The speaker of
the Council has not changed. The Council's composition also remains
much the same because reelection of incumbents provided stability. This
picture will radically change, however, as term limits force these officials
out of office on January 1, 2002. New faces will then test the strength and
balance of the Charter that the 1989 Charter Revision Commission
consciously built to reflect and empower emerging populations and
interests. How well it accomplishes its goal will be tested most strongly
when new leaders with new ideas and new constituencies emerge. This
double issue of the New York Law School Law Review, and the symposium
from which it grew, provide the best history and explanation of the City's
current Charter. Until now, there has been no similar attempt to describe
comprehensively the political and governmental ideas embraced by the
Charter Commission that informed its recommendations and supported its
allocation of power and responsibilities. The efforts by the two editorial
boards of the New York Law School Law Review who have worked on this
issue have contributed enormously toward a better understanding of the
government of the City of New York. The issue and the articles will be
read, saved, and recognized as the starting point to understanding the 1989
Charter and to formulating the next century's debates over the Charter's
allocation of power.

